MINELRES: RFE/RL: Georgian leadership woos Armenian, Azerbaijani minorities

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RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 8, No. 25, Part I, 9 February 2004


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GEORGIAN LEADERSHIP WOOS ARMENIAN, AZERBAIJANI MINORITIES

By Liz Fuller and Richard Giragosian

        One of the first moves made by the interim Georgian
leadership that came to power last November was to launch a campaign
to win the support of the country's Azerbaijani and Armenian
minorities, which number approximately 500,000 and 250,000,
respectively, or some 11.4 percent and 5.7 percent of the total
population of 4.37 million.
        The overwhelming majority of both communities live compactly
in regions where they constitute up to 90 percent of the total
population. In the case of the Azerbaijanis, the area in question
comprises the Bolnisi, Marneuli, and Dmanisi raions southeast of
Tbilisi, while the Armenians constitute a majority in Djavakheti
(Armenian Djavakhk), in the south of Georgia, bordering on Armenia.
        Low-level tensions have existed for decades between the
Georgians and the two minority communities, and those tensions
trigger sporadic eruptions of violence. In the most recent incidents,
some 20 Armenians attacked Georgians in a village in the southern
district of Tsalka on 29 January, and a Georgian stabbed and fatally
wounded an elderly Azerbaijani in Dmanisi on 3 February in a dispute
over land.
        Members of both ethnic communities tend to identify with the
country of their ethnicity, rather than the country of which they are
technically citizens. Zurab Melikishvili, governor of the
Azerbaijani-populated region, was quoted by the Azerbaijani daily
"Zerkalo" in December as saying "many local residents do not even
understand what country they live in." Earlier last year, "Zerkalo"
noted that during the April 2000 Georgian presidential election some
bewildered Azerbaijani voters had asked why the name of
then-Azerbaijani President Heidar Aliyev did not figure on the ballot
paper.
        Among both communities, knowledge of the Georgian language is
rare, with Russian being the most commonly known second language.
Consequently, the Azerbaijanis tend to watch Azerbaijani (and
Turkish) television channels, rather than Georgian, while the
Armenians of Djavakheti watch Armenian and Russian programming. In
light of the strong ethnic identity among these two minority
communities, their interest in or even awareness of national Georgian
issues is fundamentally hindered by the twin barriers of limited
language and a lack of access to the national media.
        For that reason, the new Georgian leadership's campaign to
win the hearts and minds of the two communities began with the
introduction of a token 15-minute program on state television
specifically targeting each ethnic group. A similar move tried to
encourage the participation of the regions' ethnic Azerbaijani and
Armenian voters in the 4 January pre-term presidential election by
printing ballot papers in Armenian and Azerbaijani, as well as
Georgian, in order to avoid a situation in which voters with no
knowledge of Georgian would have to ask polling station officials for
assistance in marking ballot papers. This proved logistically
impossible, and ballot papers were instead printed in both Georgian
and Russian.
        In a further gesture to Azerbaijanis' sensibilities, the
Georgian government will restore historic Azerbaijani village names
that were replaced by Georgian toponyms, Caucasus Press reported on
22 January.
        Observers point out, however, that the new Georgian
leadership will have its work cut out to secure the support of the
Azerbaijani community. The region southeast of Tbilisi is
predominantly agricultural, with many Azerbaijanis having lost out
during the privatization of agricultural land, and those who do
engage in farming encounter serious problems when they try to
transport their produce to Azerbaijan to sell. In addition, the
militant nationalist rhetoric of new Georgian President Mikheil
Saakashvili has engendered in many Azerbaijanis fear of a backlash
against non-Georgians comparable to that unleashed under Zviad
Gamsakhurdia in 1990-91. And according to "Zerkalo" of 23 December,
some Azerbaijanis are unhappy at the choice as Georgia's new state
flag of the banner of Saakashvili's National Movement. That flag --
featuring five red crosses on a white background -- dates back to the
13th century and has purely Christian connotations.
        The Armenians of Djavakheti pose an even more daunting
challenge to Tbilisi. The region, one of the poorest in Georgia, has
suffered decades of economic neglect and underdevelopment. As with
the neighboring Azerbaijani community, the Djavakhk population is
seriously impoverished and the Russian military base in Akhalkalaki
and accompanying service industry is the largest source of
employment, providing jobs for many local Armenians.
        Moreover, the Russian base has not just economic but also
strategic significance for Djavakheti. The region's population is
particularly sensitive to the proximity of Armenia's historic foe
Turkey, especially as much of the local population are descendants of
the Armenian refugees who fled Ottoman Turkey in the aftermath of the
genocide in the early 20th century. In addition, Djavakheti was
actually invaded by the Turkish army in 1918, prior to the extension
of Soviet rule, and the region's border with Turkey is twice the
length of that with Armenia. The Russian base, which will mark its
75th anniversary this year, therefore provides psychological
reassurance to the Armenian community and indeed is viewed as the
sole guarantee of their security.
        This stance has been further hardened over the past decade by
the failure of the Georgian state to meet the most basic needs of
Djavakheti's largely Armenian population. The region's geographical
isolation from the rest of Georgia has been compounded by decades of
neglect of infrastructure, with roads that have not been repaired or
repaved in nearly two decades. Local Armenians therefore find it more
convenient to travel to neighboring Armenia for such necessities as
medical care and hospitalization, as well as for higher education.
        That socioeconomic crisis has given rise to a degree of
political dissatisfaction, fuelled by years of autocratic rule by
local governors directly appointed by the Georgian president, and
which has found expression in a growing movement for greater
political rights and representation. The most prominent advocate for
the local Armenians to emerge in recent years is an unofficial
political party known as Virk. This group, denied formal
certification as a political party by the Georgian authorities
despite repeated appeals, has broadened its popular support in recent
months by presenting itself as a product of local civil society along
the lines of Saakashvili's "rose revolution."
        Virk also enjoys growing support in neighboring Armenia. The
group has demonstrated impressive prudence and maturity,
acknowledging that to seek anything greater than autonomy for
Djavakhk would be both dangerous and threatening to Tbilisi, and
downplaying more aggressive calls by some for outright secession or
unification with Armenia. But any continued neglect of the core
economic problems in the region could weaken this moderate stance.
And politically, it would be to Tbilisi's advantage to recognize Virk
as an official political party and treat it as a legitimate partner
in the search for solutions to the region's problems, thereby
preempting any escalation in the population's demands or discontent.
        The danger exists, however, that faced with more urgent
problems such as galvanizing the economy, meeting popular
expectations of an increase in living standards, and the standoff
with embattled Adjar leader Aslan Abashidze, the new Georgian
leadership will continue to delay addressing the challenge posed by
the resentful Azerbaijani and Armenian communities. Ironically, it
was Abashidze who, possibly in a bid to shore up his own increasingly
precarious hold on power, has proposed the most rational approach to
defusing the tensions between Georgia's historic provinces and the
central government -- by transforming the country into a full-fledged
federation.
        In a 16 January letter to President Saakashvili,
Djavakhk-based NGOs similarly argued that the Georgian constitution
should be amended to establish a federative or confederative
structure. Such a move, they reasoned, would not only strengthen
Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, but facilitate a
solution to Djavakhk's long-standing political, socioeconomic, and
cultural neglect.

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