MINELRES: Caucasus Reporting Service No. 177: excerpts
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WELCOME TO IWPR'S CAUCASUS REPORTING SERVICE, No. 177, May 1, 2003.
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CIRCASSIANS TURN FULL CIRCLE
Descendents of Caucasus �migr�s hoped to make new lives back in their
ancestral lands, but many are giving up in disappointment
By Zarina Kanukova in Nalchik
When they sailed away from the Caucasus in the 19th century, it seemed
unlikely that a century and a half later the descendents of the
Circassian community would return.
Some of the great-grandchildren of those who left to settle across the
Middle East did trickle back with the fall of Communism - but their
romantic notions were dashed by the reality of life in today's Russian
Federation. And now many of them are leaving again.
There are an estimated 3.5 million descendants of emigrants from the
North Caucasus living in the Middle East and Turkey. More than three
million of them are Circassians whose forebears were forced to leave the
Caucasus in the 19th century at the end of the Caucasian wars.
The size of the Circassian diaspora far exceeds the number who still
live in the North Caucasus, mainly in the three autonomous republics of
Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachai-Cherkessia and Adygeya.
Dinamis Tausultan from Syria was one of those who made the move back to
Nalchik, the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria, 11 years ago. Now with her
parents and two brothers, she runs a chain of caf�s in the town. "At
least we're here, in our native land from which we were once forcibly
deported," she said.
"I still visit my relations back in Syria, but I definitely want to live
here in the Caucasus. No price is too high for being able to freely
speak your own language, which your mother and grandmother carefully
preserved for you. Our homeland is a holy place. I feel our return has
made the souls of our ancestors rejoice."
But the number of those planning to move back to the Caucasus has
dwindled in recent years, and hundreds of those who returned stayed only
a few years. By the returnees' own calculations, 600 Circassians have
returned to Kabardino-Balkaria from Syria since 1992, but 200 of them
went back after a while. About 500 more have returned to
Kabardino-Balkaria and Adygeya from Turkey. There are currently some 350
returnees in Adygeya.
Some Circassians in the Middle East had little comprehension of the
changes that Soviet rule had wrought to culture and daily life.
"In our mind's eye, before we came here, we all imagined the Caucasus of
our forefathers," said Majid Utij, who moved back from Turkey 13 years
ago. "I used to visualise riders in Circassian coats and girls
fetching jugs of water from the spring."
IWPR talked to a Circassian family originally from Syria, who are
preparing to go back to the Middle East after spending three years in
Nalchik. They asked for their names not to be used.
"I had my own business in Syria, but my childhood dream was to return to
the land of my forefathers," said the father. "I told my fianc�e she had
to promise to move back to the Caucasus with me if she wanted to be my
wife. I've spent all my savings here trying to start a business, but I
haven't found work partners I could rely on."
"I am a religious person and I live by the commandments of Islam," added
his wife. "I thought Kabardino-Balkaria was a Muslim republic, but I was
not prepared for what I found. There are very few true Muslim families
here. Adygeyan culture is all but forgotten. I would like my
grandchildren to grow up in a Muslim country.
"I'm sad that my husband's dream of dying in the homeland will not come
true."
The culture shocks faced by Circassian returnees have been compounded by
Russian bureaucratic difficulties. The latest of these is a new
citizenship law, which came into force in July 2002.
"For four years any foreign national was entitled to seek dual
citizenship, and many of our compatriots from abroad did so," explained
Zaurbi Nakhushev, chairman of the Parliamentary Council of
Kabardino-Balkaria, who is also president of the International
Circassian Association. "But the new Russian citizenship law does not
provide for this."
The new law stipulates that in order to qualify for Russian citizenship,
the applicant must be fluent in Russian, give up his former citizenship,
and must have lived in Russia permanently for five years. Many
Circassians believe this will dry up the return of their Middle Eastern
compatriots altogether.
"Despite all my patriotism, I wouldn't be able to comply," said Utij.
"No one would."
"The new law discriminates against the three million-strong Circassian
community abroad," Vladimir Nakatsev, chairman of the
Kabardino-Balkarian branch of the Rodina (Homeland) Association, told
IWPR. "We have asked our diaspora leaders in Jordan to petition
President Putin. In his reply, he wrote that the law is not dogma, and
is open to amendments."
The first problem that returnees to Kabardino-Balkaria face is obtaining
a residence permit entitling them to live there for five years. Aslan
Betrozov, senior inspector at the visa and registration office in
Nalchik, told IWPR that this can take up to six months.
"Foreign nationals may face difficulties gathering all the requisite
paperwork. Then the package of paperwork has to undergo a thorough
check," he said.
Until recently, Adygeya had simpler procedures for issuing residence
permits and Russian passports. Many have taken advantage of this and are
grateful to the local authorities, although others say the Adygeyan
officials were just more corruptible.
"I don't want to pay bribes or pull strings to solve my problems," said
Nikhat Berzeg, who was in the first wave of returning Circassians and is
now officially registered as a resident of Maikop, Adygeya. "One has to
defend one's rights under the law. If we pay bribes it will only
complicate things for the newly arriving returnees."
It's not just the Russian authorities who have proved a source of
disappointment for returning diaspora members. Some are unhappy with the
associations that were set up in the early 1990s to advance Circassian
interests.
"Adyga Khasa and the International Circassian Association were
established to address ethnic issues, including ours, but they are not
doing their job," said Utij.
Ahmed Stash, born in Syria and now a Russian citizen, agrees. "We
shouldn't trust these organizations," he said. "In 10 years they haven't
kept a single promise they made to us."
Recalling once prominent Circassian community leaders, Utij said, "Those
who spoke at rallies 10 years ago, calling for all Adygeyans to unite,
have vanished without a trace. When we started saying things like that,
the authorities reacted very swiftly to suppress us."
Those who weather the bureaucratic ordeal of obtaining a Russian
passport, finding a job and putting down roots, say that new returnees
need to tough it out and be adaptable in order to survive in the North
Caucasus. They blame those who have left for spreading negative rumours
about life in the homeland.
"If you come back you must find a way not only to survive, but also to
prosper - and to make friends, not just find your relatives," said Imdat
Kip, who opened a trading firm in Nalchik 10 years ago.
As the two communities, in the North Caucasus and the Middle East,
remain isolated from one another, linguists and historians are warning
that the Circassians abroad are losing their mother tongue. They warn
that the Circassian language could die out in Turkey, Syria and Jordan
in the next 20 to 30 years.
Zarina Kanukova is editor of the Oshkhamakho magazine in Nalchik,
Kabardino-Balkaria.
MYTHS AND REALITIES OF KARABAKH WAR
Misinformation and false versions of history in Armenia and Azerbaijan
perpetuate the Nagorny Karabakh tragedy.
By Thomas de Waal in London
The failure to resolve the conflict over the mountainous territory of
Nagorny Karabakh remains the most serious problem in the south Caucasus,
blighting the peaceful development of the whole region.
Almost nine years after Armenians and Azerbaijanis signed the ceasefire
agreement that halted the war in 1994, and ten years after the first
United Nations resolution on the conflict on April 30, 1993 the dispute
is no nearer resolution.
One reason it remains unsettled is that the combatants have fostered
myths and propaganda, which reinforce their - mistaken - perception that
they are the guiltless victims of the conflict, while the other side is
the dangerous aggressor.
The misinformation comes down to basic facts. Officials in Azerbaijan,
the losing side in the conflict, routinely say that the country has one
million refugees, and that twenty per cent of what is internationally
recognized as the territory of Azerbaijan is occupied by the Armenians.
Yet an analysis of the facts suggests that while Azerbaijan does have a
large population of refugees, there are in fact around 750,000 of them.
A little over half a million were displaced from in and around Karabakh
in 1992-94, and the rest fled Armenia in 1988-90.
A detailed calculation shows that the Armenians hold a little under
12,000 square kilometres of the recognised territory of Azerbaijan, a
figure that includes Karabakh itself. That translates as 13.62 per cent
of the territory of Azerbaijan.
On the other side, the entity's Armenians frequently state that they
have a population of 140,000 people - thus buttressing their claims for
self-determination. But estimates by international aid workers in
Karabakh put the figure much lower, at perhaps half that.
A breakthrough in peace talks is only likely if each side faces up to
its responsibility for the violence it committed against the other, yet
the picture here is depressing. The two presidents, Heidar Aliev in
Azerbaijan and Robert Kocharian in Armenia, who have come close to a
compromise in private, must share the blame as they repeat mythologized
stories of "suffering" and "heroism" in public.
The beginning of the dispute dates back to February 1988, when the
Armenian-dominated regional soviet (communist-era assembly) in the
autonomous region of Nagorny Karabakh requested to be allowed to leave
Soviet Azerbaijan and join Soviet Armenia. It was an unprecedented act
for the Gorbachev era and triggered the first inter-ethnic quarrel of
the late Soviet Union - a quarrel that played a significant role in
dissolving the whole union itself.
A few days after the entity's Armenians made their request, the first
serious violence took place in, the Karabakh village of Askeran and the
Azerbaijani town of Sumgait.
Yet research now shows that the first trouble began the year before, in
1987. Azerbaijanis fled the southern Armenian region of Kafan, while
Armenian villagers were beaten up in Chardakhlu, an Armenian village in
Azerbaijan. The Armenian nationalist activist Igor Muradian organised a
mass petition in Karabakh, sent delegations to Moscow and received small
arms from outside the Soviet Union.
This is important because it demonstrates that the dispute started from
below and received immediate grass-roots support on the ground. While
both sides are inclined to blame the hand of Moscow for the beginning of
the conflict, the evidence suggests that the communist authorities were
caught unawares and unable to control a rapidly spreading bush-fire.
Both sides have since told and retold stories describing the
"aggression" of the other, and playing down the violence which they
themselves committed.
Few Armenians know that dozens of Azerbaijanis died fleeing Armenia in
1988-89 - in Armenia the story is that the Azerbaijani minority's
departure was peaceful. And while a beautiful 18th century mosque has
recently been restored in Yerevan, few of its citizens recall that a
small Azerbaijani mosque on what is now Vardanants Street was demolished
by a bulldozer in 1990.
In Azerbaijan, the terrible pogroms that led to the deaths of 32 people
in the town of Sumgait in February 1988 were the first mass violence of
the dispute. Azerbaijanis now routinely portray them as having been a
"provocation" organised by the KGB in Moscow, or even by underground
Armenians.
Yet detailed research showed that none of the supposed evidence for this
stands up: the responsibility goes squarely back to the then authorities
in Azerbaijan and the Sumgait rioters themselves.
The Armenians' victory in 1994 can be attributed to three factors: the
Armenians were better organized and prepared militarily; Azerbaijan was
in more or less permanent chaos between 1991 and 1994; and the Russians,
after initially helping both sides, began to help the Armenians more.
In the early phase of the war, most of the Russian troops fighting -
never a large number - were Soviet army officers based in the Caucasus
and looking for work on either side.
In perhaps the most bizarre phase of the conflict, the Azerbaijanis
pushed deep into Karabakh in June and July 1992, using Russian tanks and
crews from the Soviet 4th Army. The Armenians then persuaded the
Russians to send in a helicopter squadron, which repulsed the Russian
tank attack and halted the Azerbaijani advance on Stepanakert.
By 1993, Moscow was taking a more strategic interest. Levon
Ter-Petrosian, Armenia's president between 1991 and 1996, now reveals
that he received arms shipments from Russia, which were personally
approved in writing by President Boris Yeltsin. This admission
contradicts what has been for many years the official Armenian version
of the war. Ter-Petrosian insists, however, that Russia only helped
Armenia because it wanted to "preserve the military balance" and close
the arms gaps between the two countries.
"It turned out that there were more three times more weapons in
Azerbaijan than in Armenia," Levon Ter-Petrosian said. "And when we
talked to the Russian side, we came to the conclusion - and I managed to
get them to agree to this - that we should be compensated for this. And
Yeltsin agreed to this and agreed that the balance should be preserved."
Russia now plays a much more positive role in the dispute, and has a
more balanced relationship with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Along with
France and the United States, it is one of three main mediators in the
conflict. Yet, despite high-level involvement, including from President
Jacques Chirac himself, the mediators have failed to engineer a
breakthrough.
The prime responsibility for untying the Karabakh knot and freeing up
the Caucasus belongs to those who will benefit most: the people and
leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan and the two communities of Karabakh.
The omens are not good. On each side, a whole generation of
schoolchildren is growing up completely isolated from the other, and
reading textbooks that present a nationalistic and distorted version of
the tragic history of the Karabakh conflict.
Thomas de Waal is IWPR's Caucasus Editor. His book, "Black Garden:
Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War" is published today, May 1,
by New York University Press.
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