Fwd: Plight of Azeri Minority in Russia

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Subject: Fwd: Plight of Azeri Minority in Russia

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Fwd: Plight of Azeri Minority in Russia


From:: William McKinney <[email protected]>
 
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From: Center for Civil Society International <[email protected]>

The following article is Xposted in full from the "Perspective and NIS
Observed" list of the Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology
and Policy, operated by Miriam Lanskoy <[email protected]>
More information about the institute follows Kurbanov's article.

Kurbanov is board member of the organization, Azeri National Cultural
Autonomy of Russia. He also is a Senior Researcher at the Institute of
Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences.

PRECARIOUS FUTURE FOR AN URBAN MINORITY: ETHNIC AZERIS IN RUSSIA
''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
By Rafik Kurbanov

The threat by Russian authorities to introduce a visa regime and a ban
on trade, financial transfers and air travel with Azerbaijan has
shocked the Azeri community, which views this as a new step in an
existing pattern of prejudice and pressure. This campaign of ethnic
intimidation aims at two related goals: creating an obedient,
frightened minority from which bribes can be extorted easily, and
achieving political popularity among Russians by means of "keeping the
blacks down." The third and external objective is to pressure the
Azeri government into concessions on a variety of issues.

The Chechen conflict and official propaganda have added a new twist to
traditional Russian prejudice toward peoples from the Caucasus. Thus,
his consideration of additional punitive policies further increased
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's popularity among a majority of Russian
citizens, just as Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov has garnered a great deal
of popular support by implementing an especially heavy-handed policy
toward minorities. Luzhkov "is hunting down Caucasians, has turned
Moscow into a screening camp, and is eliciting a chauvinistic wave in
this multinational state," according to Samara Governor Konstantin
Titov. (Novye izvestiya, 25 Sep 99; Middle East News Items, via
lexis-nexis)

The sudden influx into Russia of hundreds of thousands of ethnic
Azeris, starting in the late 1980s, was the result of two related
processes: the Armenian-Azerbaijani war over Nagorno-Karabakh and
economic deterioration in Azerbaijan. Russia was the natural
destination due to its geographical proximity, unrestricted access and
social and cultural familiarity. Now there are about 2 million ethnic
Azeris living in Russia (most of them in Moscow) who have become an
urban minority - a new phenomenon in ethnic dynamics for post-Soviet
Russia, which previously had faced mostly territorial aspects of
ethnic relations. In some cases, such ethnic-territorial problems were
peacefully negotiated (i.e., Tatarstan) while other conflicts became
very violent (i.e., Chechnya). The urban minority issue, therefore,
presents an unfamiliar dilemma for the new Russian state, which at
this point has opted for a policy of police repression.

In economic terms, most Azeris in Russia filled a niche as small
retail traders/street vendors, not a profession particularly favored
by Russians. The nature of this profession leads to daily encounters
with an economically vulnerable Russian population, unhappy with high
prices, so that Azeris are often accused of "profiteering"
(spekuliatsia), when they sell goods at a price which seems too high.
However, high prices are the result of constant bribery of - and
extortion by - the police, while traders take the blame. [Nor is
extortion limited to officials. In October, Azeri traders at a Russian
market were attacked by carloads of Russian men wielding iron bars.
According to one of the traders, the assault stemmed from the traders'
refusal to pay inflated entrance fees raised from 172 to 1,400 rubles.
(The Moscow Times, 14 Oct 99; via lexis-nexis)]

Indeed, street vendors are easy prey for police and other officials.
Some estimate that Azeri traders and businesses pay the equivalent of
about US$200 million each month as tax payment, fees, registration,
etc. (Compatriot newspaper, Jan 99) The amount of bribes is often
equal to the taxes paid. In any case, even by conservative estimates,
the total extorted from the Azeri community in Moscow alone reaches
millions of US dollars each month - a very large amount by Russian
standards.

The Azeris are politically vulnerable because they lack representation
in governing organs that could protect them from the police.
Currently, there are attempts to create some kind of organizational
structures for self-protection; however, this is unlikely to be
successful in the face of governmental repression. Moreover, there is
a fear that anything beyond a purely cultural association may be
labeled a "terrorist" organization. Thus, the September 1999 issue of
the popular weekly newspaper Versiya, featured an article that called
the only high school in Moscow with some Azeri curriculum a potential
terrorist training camp.

Economic pressure is combined with other forms of repression, such as
police brutality and racial targeting (profiling). Besides rounding up
dozens of vendors on the open markets and conducting strip searches
without a warrant or probable cause, such repression often includes
confiscation of goods and willful destruction of legally obtained
residence documents. (Segodnya, 18 Sep 99) Indeed, reports of police
harrassment of Caucasian peoples in Moscow have become commonplace.
(The Scotsman, 19 Nov 99) The absence of a sound judicial system and
the vulnerable immigrant status force the Azeri minority in Russia to
keep a low profile and to avoid seeking recourse from Russian courts.

The situation has worsened since the Chechen war began, as ethnic
minorities from the Caucasus are often identified as a potential
source of terrorist activity. During security sweeps this fall,
following the spate of bombings, more than 20,000 persons were
detained, a majority of whom were dark-skinned.  However, even in
normal times, "police officers routinely stop individuals to check
their documents; overwhelmingly, they are darker-skinned people
(typical of the Caucasus region) known in Russia as 'blacks.'" (Inter
Press Service, 27 Sep 99; via lexis-nexis) In the latest moves, the
Russian government has discussed options for introducing a visa regime
with Azerbaijan and establishing some sort of control over Azeri
citizens in Russia, as well as restricting money transfers to
Azerbaijan (thereby affecting the livelihood of thousands of Azeri
families whose only source of income are the sums sent from Russia by
relatives).

In Moscow, Mayor Luzhkov has already taken steps to establish internal
control by signing an order demanding that all "visitors" re-register
with the authorities; police comb the streets and check documents.
Masked police officers reportedly are grabbing dark-skinned men from
their stalls in open-air markets and dragging them away. (The Gazette
(Montreal), 26 Sep 99; via lexis-nexis). This increased pressure on
the community, which stops just short of open deportation, may at some
point lead to more violence if the level of police brutality becomes
intolerable. Taking into account the numbers of Azeris in Russia and
the fact that they are predominantly young males, such reaction may
add another factor of instability in a very unstable Russia.  Another
possibility is that a mass exodus of Azeris from Russian may occur.

It seems that the Azeri community in Russia is being used to exert
pressure on the Azeri government to prevent any potential support for
the Chechens, although there is no factual basis to support Russia's
allegations of Azeri aid to Chechnya. The Azerbaijani government
repeatedly has said that it supports Russia's territorial integrity.
Discrediting the current Azeri government is another possible outcome
of these policies. However, significant destabilization of Azerbaijan
could result in an unpredictable outcome. While Russia may hope that
such destabilization would produce a more friendly regime in
Azerbaijan, the example of Iran in 1979 shows that such situations are
unpredictable and unmanageable. Russia exerts influence over
Azerbaijan through the economic lever of allowing the Azeri business
people to operate in Moscow and other cities.  If these people leave,
Azerbaijan will be destabilized, but Russia will also lose, because it
will have wasted its leverage.

Rafik Kurbanov, Ph.D., is a board member of the Azeri National
Cultural Autonomy of Russia. He also is a Senior Researcher at the
Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences. He can be
reached at [email protected].
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