Fwd: Sonja Biserko's comment: The Balkan endgame
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Subject: Fwd: Sonja Biserko's comment: The Balkan endgame
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Fwd: Sonja Biserko's comment: The Balkan endgame
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(Fwd) COMMENT: THE BALKAN ENDGAME by Sonja Biserko
COMMENT: THE BALKAN ENDGAME
Belgrade still believes it is on the verge of a historic victory. In
response, the West needs a comprehensive regional strategy.
By Sonja Biserko
Even at this late stage, the Serbian regime - not just President
Slobodan Milosevic, but a substantial proportion of the establishment
- believe it has a chance not only to survive the NATO campaign but
indeed to emerge victorious with a new Greater Serbia.
Under scenarios seriously discussed in Belgrade, officials hope that
fatigue and splits within the NATO alliance, and concerns for the
regional ramifications, will cause the West to call a conference and
negotiate peace. This would be a major historical event, along the
lines of the 1878 Congress of Berlin, involving all the regional
players. And, if Serbian negotiators have their way, it would be a
time for territorial swapping and fresh map-making. The key deal would
be to partition Kosovo, hiving off a southern strip from Yugoslavia in
exchange for some of Bosnia.
It is crucial for Western planners charting the course of the war to
understand the implications of this. Far from in retreat, the Belgrade
regime - while losing important military and economic assets - feels
itself to be well positioned for a historic victory against the
world's largest military alliance and its only superpower.
To most Western observers, this may seem astounding. But a proper
understanding of the Serbian power structure reveals why - from
Belgrade's perspective - it is utterly logical. And it makes clear
that the West must adopt a comprehensive strategy and a region-wide
approach for long-term peace and stability.
The destruction caused by NATO will cost Serbia dearly. It will annul
the efforts of several generations in developing its infrastructure.
But it is also destroying the rudimentary institutions of democracy.
As a result, contrary to expectations both in the West and in the
region, an uprising against Milosevic is hard to imagine. Thus the
likely outcomes within Serbia are: Milosevic's survival and a personal
dictatorship, a coup d'etat and a military dictatorship, or rivalry
among competing warlords and total chaos. None of these would be
likely to bring a positive policy change from Belgrade.
The negotiations, at Rambouillet and then Paris, also suggested a
flawed strategy. The delayed and inadequate response by the European
powers leading up to the talks gave ample time for Milosevic's
expansionist and repressive policies to be put in place. Resisting a
leading US role in Kosovo for so long, the Europeans allowed Belgrade
to launch the war unopposed. The negotiating posture tended to
equalise all sides and inevitably led to concessions to the "stronger
side" - ie, the Serbs. Confusion over the response to the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA), without any effort to analyse the roots of the
crisis and the reasons for the emergence of the KLA, gave a green
light to Serbia to launch its attacks on villages, under the guise of
"exterminating terrorists." The Europeans' anxiety over refugees also
contributed to a negative stereotype about Kosovo Albanians.
The Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement of October 1998 was probably the
last chance for a peaceful resolution. Understanding that the
international community did not expect conflict until spring, and
believing that there would probably be no intervention anyway,
Milosevic initiated his build-up in Kosovo and, once again, confronted
the international community with a fait accompli.
But by taking Kosovo and the whole Kosovo Albanian community hostage,
Milosevic triggered a reaction he did not expect and has no answer
for. Milosevic's decision to reject the Rambouillet accords finally
forced the NATO powers to define the nature of the conflicts that have
plagued southeastern Europe for the past decade. For the first time,
the West recognised them clearly as a series of Serbian wars of
aggression and conquest.
This posture incensed the regime in Belgrade, which then fully
revealed its war aims: the complete cleansing of Albanians from
Kosovo. The possible loss of Kosovo was first mentioned in the
infamous Serbian Academy Memorandum, which laid out the Greater Serbia
national project back in 1986. Dobrica Cosic, the national writer and
one-time president of the country, has predicted many times that "the
20th century will end for the Serbian people with the loss of Kosovo
and Metohia." Yet by unleashing a full war against its own Albanian
citizens, the regime displayed its complete inability to adopt to the
shift in Western policy towards such regional conflicts, and the
Balkans in particular. Instead it has sought - and so far succeeded -
in creating "new realities" on the ground in Kosovo, in pursuit of its
maximalist aims.
The beginning of the bombing campaign was treated in Belgrade as
another of NATO's simulations. Belgrade simply did not believe it was
real. Accordingly, the first reactions by the regime and the public
were defiance and derision. Officially, this remains the stance, as
evidenced for example by the daily rock concerts throughout Serbia.
Yet in fact only a few days of air strikes sufficed to strip the
Serbia political scenery of its false covering. The ethnic cleansing
of Kosovo Albanians demonstrated once again the utmost cruelty and
barbarity of the Serbian war machinery. The concerts and other
demonstrations actually reveal a refusal of the population to confront
the atrocities being committed in Kosovo in their name. People in
Serbia are undergoing a mass denial which is itself commensurate to
the crime taking place before the eyes of the whole world.
Unfortunately, the developments have also demonstrated that the
democratic alternative is almost negligible. The media became the
first victim of the bombing, and all information has been put under
direct state control. The declaration of a state of emergency, as well
as the introduction of capital punishment, martial law, a partial
mobilisation, a pardoning of criminals and the drafting of volunteers
- such measures have closed all avenues of possible resistance.
Fuelled by wild propaganda and increasing criminal banditry, Serbia is
heading down the path of no return. Displaying, indeed glorifying
Serbian obstinacy, the regime is on the verge of self-destruction,
rejecting all prospects of mediation and causing damage throughout the
region.
Rather than strengthening, the structure in Serbia is in fact
crumbling and heading towards chaos. Serbia faces an inevitable moral
collapse and historic debacle. It refuses to confront the policies of
the past, and even the crimes for which it is responsible day by day.
Indeed, while Milosevic bears primary responsibility for disasters
caused by the regime, in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and now Kosovo, he
has only followed and expressed the collective consciousness of much
of the Serbian elite - especially within the security forces.
As such, Serbia cannot hope for integration into the mainstream of
European structures without massive assistance from the international
community. This means that the expected NATO presence in Kosovo will
not be enough. A protectorate in the province will enable the
deportees to return in safety and prevent the spreading of the refugee
wave in to Europe.
But after a decade of failed policies in the Balkans, it is essential
that the US and the European democracies articulate a long-term vision
for the whole region. This must start with the de-Nazification of
Serbia. A mini-Marshall plan for economic recovery will be essential.
And a long-term security structure is a prerequisite for continued
peace and stability. The West may debate ground troops in Kosovo. But
the reality is that, in the long term, an international force will be
required in Serbia, too.
Sonja Biserko is director of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights
in Serbia. She is now living outside the country.
-------------
[email protected]
nationale Kosovo actie samenwerkende hulopganisaties
giro 555 Den Haag
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