The Minority Rights Paradox (from War Report)

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Date: Thu, 2 Apr 1998 14:46:21 +0300 (EET DST)
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Subject: The Minority Rights Paradox (from War Report)

From: MINELRES moderator <[email protected]> 

Original sender: Panayote Elias Dimitras <[email protected]>

The Minority Rights Paradox (from War Report)


The Minority Rights Paradox
 
Panayote Elias Dimitras
 
(War Report, number 58, February-March 1998)
 
Ten years ago very few people were aware of the existence, let alone
the problems, of most minorities in the Balkan South. The human rights
debate in the region was centred on dictatorial regimes whose
authoritarianism deprived their citizens of most, if not all
fundamental rights, irrespective of their ethnic or religious
identity. Turkey sometimes featured on the list of human rights
abusers, its all-powerful military and the regular persecution of the
opposition giving the country an image of an authoritarian regime
little better than Yugoslavia.

Greece was perceived somewhat differently. The prevailing perception
was that although her recent past (the 1967-1974 dictatorship) had
been problematic, in the 1980s she was safely anchored in the Western
world, politically liberal and apparently devoid of human rights
problems, with the troubles that had plagued the country for most of
its history now firmly in the past.

The only minority-related issue anyone was aware of was the brutal
assimilationist policies of Bulgaria towards her Turkish citizens, as
witnessed in the notorious "revivalist process" of the late 1980s,
when the communist regime compelled Turks, sometimes with brutal
force, to change their names into Bulgarian ones so as in an attempt
to "revive" their supposed Bulgarian ancestry. The beginning of the
Kurdish struggle in Turkey was also attracting some attention.

Things have changed dramatically since then. Those with an interest in
the area detail at least half a dozen ethnic, religious, or linguistic
minorities in each country. Governments throughout the region,
post-communist or not, have a reputation for varying degrees of
intolerance towards their minorities. The problems of the Turks in
Greece and in Macedonia are well-known; concern for the Albanian
population in Macedonia has raised fears of the possibility of another
Balkan confrontation; while the Greek minority in Albania almost
brought the two countries to war. Not only Turkey but also Greece is
seen as guilty of serious violations of minority rights, with
discriminatory practices reminiscent of those once used by the
military junta against its political opponents. These have included
revocation of citizenship and prosecution for "deviating" opinions.

Minority and other human rights are much better covered in the media
now. Minorities themselves are visible and vocal, while human rights
organisations have grown, with many doing serious and credible work to
remind their governments and the media of their obligations to respect
human rights. International governmental organisations like the
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of
Europe have produced documents guaranteeing minority rights and
mechanisms to monitor states' compliance, while the European Court of
Human Rights is busier than ever.

The culture of minority rights has developed to an unprecedented
extent. However reluctantly, all states know they have at least to
pretend to be respectful of their minorities. Otherwise they risk
being excluded from European or other international institutions -
something that would harm their interests. In fact, the Council of
Europe has developed a series of criteria for new and continuing
members supposedly so stringent that some countries have been hampered
in their efforts to meet them in full. If only such criteria were
applied to the Council's old members, which are not necessarily human
rights havens.

This is far from an "Era of Human Rights" for minorities, however. The
apparently widespread interest in human and minority rights is rarely
devoid of ulterior motives and thus subjected to ensuing limitations.
It
would be naive to believe that any country views respect for civil
rights as a priority at home and abroad, and does not subjugate them
to stability or narrow-minded national interests. Western countries,
driven by anti-communist obsession, backed President Sali Berisha in
Albania and played down NGO reports of his human rights violations.
When, thanks to Berisha, the country finally collapsed into chaos in
1997, no-one in the West paused to reflect on what their unqualified
support for him had meant. On the contrary, they had found a new
affection for Macedonia's President Kiro Gligorov. Certainly, he is
far from a Berisha-style authoritarian; but his country has not
abandoned its one-party structure and mentality, and this has led to
serious violations of the very principles espoused by the Macedonian
constitution.
 
The international community's obsession with Macedonia's stability,
regardless of its human rights problems, is rooted in the country's
large Albanian minority and the fact that it is adjacent to Kosovo.
The 1997 Human Rights Report issued by the US State Department on
Macedonia is remarkable for its many omissions, especially in
comparison with reports on neighbouring countries. American diplomacy
permits reference to the fact that Macedonian political organisations
are banned in Bulgaria, but forgets to mention that the same thing
happens with their Bulgarian equivalent in Macedonia, in spite of a
recent well-publicised hunger strike by one of the group's leaders.
Worse, the trial in September 1997 of the ethnic Albanian mayor of
Gostivar and his 13-year prison sentence are also omitted. This is in
spite of NGO condemnation of his two-month detention, the unfair trial
and its outcome. It was probably thanks to this sort of protest that
the state security forces decided to free the mayor until his appeal
is heard and the courts "forgot" to set a date for the hearing. In
contrast the Greek chapter of the US report regularly includes
references to similar political trials.

Nevertheless, this absence of sincere commitment to human and minority
rights is not the main reason why minorities cannot expect a brighter
future in the Balkan South (and probably elsewhere). In spite of the
growth of a culture of minority rights in society as a whole, there is
virtually no minority rights-based political culture within the
minorities themselves. Minority organisations and the leaders who
articulate minority agendas appear to be driven mostly by
ethno-national aspirations rather than by any deep-rooted respect for
civic rights. To them, human rights are often just a tool for the
achievement of their aims, as they are for most states. And minorities
are unfortunately drawn into aping the behaviour of such states: to
the latter's hegemonic and aggressive nationalism, minorities usually
respond with various sorts of defensive and peripheral, if not
parochial, nationalism, equally exclusive and intolerant. The
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is an extreme but very eloquent example
of this tendency: its ruthless and repressive methods are a mirror
image of those used by the Turkish armed forces.

Minorities' unwillingness to see each other's demands as similar and
thus struggle together to achieve them is a further obstacle to
progress. Even formally trans-minority parties, like those in Albania
and Bulgaria, function more as vehicles for the interest of one
minority, in this case the Greeks in Albania and the Turks in
Bulgaria. In both cases, Greek and Turkish minority leaders have
stated that there is no Macedonian nation and no Macedonian minority
in their countries, aligning themselves with the hegemonic nationalism
of Greece and Bulgaria. Minority groups in Greece also hope that by
placating the country's intolerant nationalism they will improve their
situation there. To this end Greek Catholics and Greek Jews have sent
appeals to their fellow believers around the world stressing the
"historical" Greek character of Macedonia; the Jews even based their
arguments on their ancient holy books. Aromanians (Vlachs) and Arberor
(Arvanites) refuse to join forces with Macedonians (and Turks) to
enable Greece, like all other EU countries, to get a national office
of the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages. Even the Roma, much
despised by the Greek state, have rallied to the struggle with among
other things lyrical contributions on the Greekness of Macedonia. They
are also reluctant to work with international Romany organisations
which, they have been led to believe, are suspect and potentially
"anti-Greek".

Some minorities simply adhere to the nationalism of their
corresponding "mother" nation, thus becoming easy targets for charges
of separatism if not of acting as foreign agents. It is no secret that
Turkish minority policy in Greek Thrace is influenced if not shaped by
the Turkish Consulate there; just as Greek minority policy-making in
Albania is focused on the Greek embassy in Tirana and the consulate in
Gjirokastra. To a lesser extent, similar ties exist between
Macedonia's Albanians and political forces, sometimes even the
government, in Albania. Bulgaria's Turks have a comparable
relationship with Turkey. Only Macedonia appears to shy away from such
privileged relations with her minorities in neighbouring countries -
and is consequently accused of "betrayal" by the Macedonian diaspora.

The absence of links between a minority and its homeland does not
automatically make these minorities more realistic or devoid of
nationalist leanings, however. The Macedonian political movement in
Bulgaria is separatist and maximalist, a position which has not helped
them make substantial inroads into Bulgarian society. Greece's
Macedonian activists represent a wide range of beliefs, from convinced
pro-Europeans to fundamentalist nationalists. Luckily for them, the
pro-European voices have been predominant and so many Greeks have come
to sympathise with their struggle, indeed to accept what is otherwise
a "national taboo" - the existence of such a minority. In turn Greek
Macedonian problems get wider international attention than those of
their counterparts in Bulgaria, even though the latter suffer a worse
form of repression.

The confluence of these two tendencies - resorting to nationalism and
reliance upon the mother nation's uncritical support - is probably the
main reason why minorities in the Balkan South lack charismatic but at
the same time pragmatic leaderships. Moreover, in the rare case of
such a leader, for example Arben Xhaferi, president of the Democratic
Party of Albanians in Macedonia, every effort possible has been
deployed to disarm him politically. In the words of a Western human
rights activist, he is "the victim of the oldest political trick:
label your enemies as extreme. In fact, his demands are quite
reasonable and I am inclined to believe that he is trying to control
the more radical elements around him. Most Macedonian politicians, and
my country's ambassador, however, view his claims of looming
radicalisation as a threat."

Some may claim that there is nothing surprising in the fact that the
"human and minority rights revolution" of the 1990s has not helped
create a human rights culture among minorities, let alone majorities.
It looks like a repetition of the trends of two centuries ago: when
the "democratic revolutions" ushered in civic rights in modern
societies, while the regimes that established themselves at the time
were driven mostly by ethno-nationalism and sometimes used democracy
as a mere tool. Minorities can be heartened by this analogy: by the
fact that, nevertheless, democracy has spread since and permeated more
and more modern societies, more often in spite of, and not because of
the leaderships that have helped shape them. But it is difficult to
imagine that minority rights could regress as they did in the half
century dominated by the Cold War. Progress in minority human rights
will greatly depend on the development of strong democratic societies
in which the concept of individual rights is entrenched. Such rights
will certainly have to be "extracted" from those states which are
solidly rooted in often very intolerant ethno-nationalism.


Panayote Elias Dimitras is spokesperson for the Greek Helsinki Monitor
and Minority Rights Group - Greece.

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