Re: The Kosovo events - a subject for a new discussion

From: MINELRES moderator <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 1998 22:48:46 +0200 (EET)
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: The Kosovo events - a subject for a new discussion

From: MINELRES moderator  <[email protected]>

Original sender: Besnik Pula <[email protected]>

Re: The Kosovo events - a subject for a new discussion


The roots of the problem of Kosova are to be found in 1913, when the
Conference of Ambassadors in London sanctioned Serbia's capture of
this territory from the crumbling Ottoman Empire, despite the fact that
most of its inhabitants were non-Serbs (see Serbian census of 1921).
The Serbian successive governments tried to amend this inconvenience.
The most illustrative evidence of this is the program by the influential
Serbian academician Vaso Cubribolvic called "The Expulsion of the
Albanians" (the English version of which can be found on the Internet),
and the policies of land and property confiscation and redistribution to
Serb colonists, cultural and political suppression, forceful expulsion
and ethnocide pursued by the Serbian state beginning in 1913,
continuing throughout the 1920s and 1930s, and in communist
Yugoslavia from 1945 through 1968 under interior minister Aleksandar
Rankovic.

As for as the matter of 'collective right' vs. 'administrative settlement'
in Kosova, there are certain historical developments which must be
taken into account. First of all, the administrative province of Kosova
was defined in post-World War II Yugoslavia as a concession to
Albanian political demands, and as Tito's way of lessening Serbian
domination of Yugoslavia. Post-1968 Yugoslavia witnessed a surge in
reformist demands for decentralization of the federation and of the
communist party, an arrangement which was eventually ordained in
the constitution of 1974. This constitution defined Kosova as a
self-governing province of a federal Serbia and as a federal unit of
Yugoslavia. As a result Kosova gained its own assembly, its own
executive, its own judiciary system, and a seat in the eight-member
federal Presidency, which had a member from each of the republics
and the provinces, while the Albanians with other ethnic minorities
were given the status of constituent 'nationalities', alongside the Slav
'nations' composing the federation.

Albanians' own identification with Kosova did not begin after the
administrative division of Yugoslavia. Any look into 19th and 20th
century Albanian nationalist writings will show that Kosova is one of
the primary elements of Albanian early and contemporary nationalist
discourse. The Ottoman Vilayet of Kosova (extending into western
Macedonia and the Sandjak region between Serbia and Montenegro)
was one of the four Balkan vilayets claimed by the Albanian
independence movement as forming the territorial core of the Albanian
state. In Kosova were the major Albanian uprisings against the
Ottomans, and in the town of Prizren in southwestern Kosova is
where Albania's independence movement first began, with the League
of Prizren of 1878.

Kosova's autonomy was unilaterally revoked by Serbia when Slobodan
Milosevic made a career of promoting Kosovar Serb grievances and
using them to down his opponents in the party. Soon after coming to
power, Milosevic abolished Kosova's autonomy (1989), which was to
be suceeded by a campaign of repression against institutions in
Kosova, such as the university, the education system, state
enterprises and the police force. A large part of the Albanian working
force was dismissed from jobs, schools were closed, and measures
were taken against those opposing the new policy. By this time a
heavy police and military presence had been established, and random
police violence had become endemic. In reaction,  encouraged by the
secessionist stands of the other republics, the assembly of Kosova
declared Kosova's independence from Serbia (1991) and adopted a
constitution of the Republic of Kosova (1992). Parliamentary and
presidential elections and a referendum on independence were held
soon after.

As far as the future is concerned, it is unlikely that the Kosovar
Albanians will accept a return to the 1974 status. As far as the U.S.
and European powers are concerned, independence is out of the
question. An acceptable compromise may be an equal republican
status within the Yugoslav federation, but it is unlikely that the
current Serb leadership will accept such an arrangement. On the
other hand, at some level Kosova is a lost cause for Serbia.
Demographically the Serbs are outnumbered, and attempts to alter
the demographic structure through Albanian emigration and bringing
in Serbian colonists from Croatia and Bosnia have failed. Supporting
the 60,000 strong police force is costly, and Serbia's economy is in
shambles. It is uncertain whether Serbia can withstand another wave
of tight economic sanctions without internal unrest. Milosevic's
cronies have accumulated fortunes from war-profiteering and sanction
busting, but the general populace is becoming poorer by the day --
the pensioners, one of Milosevic's strongest support groups, have
been protesting in Belgrade for weeks, while the Serbian government
is attempting to sell a part of its Telecom shares to obtain currency to
cover state expenditures. Milosevic is now facing a choice between
risking economic collapse and further deterioration of his base of
support, and granting concessions to the Kosovars, which would hurt
him politically. It is intersting to see what Milosevic has in store this
time around.

Regards,

Besnik Pula

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