A few notes on Kosovo
From: MINELRES moderator <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
Date: Wed, 11 Mar 1998 08:13:17 +0200 (EET)
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Subject: A few notes on Kosovo
From: MINELRES moderator <[email protected]>
Original sender: Francesco Strazzari <[email protected]>
A few notes on Kosovo
Florence, March 10
The outbreak of violence and police repression in Kosovo have been
characterised by highly emotional and impressionistic media
coverage. Once again we have heard the phrase "ethnic cleansing",
a definition that is oblivious of the fact that historically the expression
"ethnic territory" was first used by Albanian nationalists referring to
predominantly Albanian-inhabited "irredenta". While biased
information is no novelty - it may even be in good faith - and news
coming from Kosovo are in most cases clearly manipulated, we have
also heard Western TV channels defining the US Information Center
in Prishtina as "the American Embassy". This kind of information,
coupled with another demonstration of the inconsistency of European
diplomacies at critical junctures, reminds of a gloomy pre-Bosnian
scenario, and risks rewarding those factions that have an interest in
escalating the conflict towards destructive outcomes, rather than
de-escalating and resolving it. I felt that a few analytical remarks
may contribute to our interpretation of these events. Since my
sources are essentially press articles, the following points are
inherently highly controversial.
1) TIMING. Time is a crucial factor in understanding Kosovo's
present conflict. Few commentators have raised the issue of why
Kosovo is erupting right now. As with the 1981 upheaval - for which
there seems to be no apparent and contingent triggers but for Tito's
death - today most of these reasons remain unknown. However,
there are a few elements that should be taken into account:
A - The long-postponed elections for Kosovo's 'parallel Republic'
are scheduled for March 22. The Kosovar political spectrum is
exhibiting unprecedented tensions. On the one hand, up to ten days
ago Rugova's presidency, and his nonviolent Kosova Democratic
League (LDK), were likely to keep a grip on society and institutions,
but also to loose much of the quasi-unanimous consensus held until
Dayton. The post-Dayton phase was characterised by a gradual
international marginalisation of the Kosovo problem, which
corresponded to the rise of more 'radical' formations in the region. In
particular, the political rise of A. Demaqi - who repeatedly hinted at an
intifada-like strategy and challenged Rugova himself - was apparently
surprised by the emergence of the Kosova Liberation Army (UCK).
Moreover, the mobilisation of students from the shadow University of
Prishtina played an important role in advocating a more proactive
strategy and more visible means of struggle against the "Serbian
apartheid". On the other hand, a major political rupture occurred
after Dayton between the Prishtina-based Presidency and executive
branches of the "Republic of Kosova", which are located abroad and
had hitherto played a seminal role in funding Kosova's institutions.
Faced with the failure to gain a full internationalisation of the issue
and some tangible results, Kosovar agencies abroad have appeared
increasingly intransigent and impatient, and began to boycott
Rugova's leadership.
B - One can hypothesize that the former Albanian president, the
'democratic' Sali Berisha, has played a role in this process. Armed
confrontations in Skhoder in mid-February appeared to some
observers as an event that heralded Kosovo's explosion. Others have
underlined the link between Berisha's security clique and the first
embryo of the UCK at the time of the upheaval in Tirana. What is
sure is that Berisha has always been particularly supportive of the
pan-Albanian cause, and that his hard-core constituency is to be
found in the Albanian districts bordering on Kosovo, a region which
at present appears to be virtually out of control. While at the time of
Berisha's Presidency in Tirana the arrival of new personnel in key
security positions was popularly termed "the rise of the Kosovars",
there is no doubt that Berisha is among the few actors who may
immensely benefit from the destabilisation of the whole region. Also,
it is now clear that several thousand arms used during the Albanian
turmoil in 1997 have been hidden and smuggled through the northern
Albanian border into Macedonia and Kosovo. One has also to
remember that during Crete Balkans' Summit, last November, the
new Albanian leader Fatos Nano has affirmed a line of moderation
vis-a-vis Albanians living out of Albania, which means encouraging
them to cooperate with state institutions and creating
good-neighbouring relations. Clearly enough, Kosovo's events put
Nano in a very difficult position with regard to the Albanian public.
C - Although one may sympathise with the predicament of Kosovar
Albanians, it is important to shed light on why this "police"
operation was carried out in the region of Drenica. For a few months,
this area has been de facto off-limits for the Serbian police,
especially at night. UCK affiliates have appeared on the international
press openly stating their armed strategy, and there has been a
clear intensification of armed provocations and killings of Albanians
that would not align with "ethnic imperatives", and would therefore be
accused of collaborationism. According to the Belgrade, until
January 1998 there have been 182 armed episodes in Kosovo, which
caused the death of 14 policemen, 29 Serb civilians and 11
"terrorists". That the wind was changing in Kosovo, and the UCK was
gaining some legitimacy, became clear on November 28, 1997, when
masked UCK members showed up at an Albanian funeral and were
enthusiastically welcomed by the crowd. According to press sources,
the UCK has training camps in Prizren, in Montenegro, and in Sweden,
and a political base in Switzerland. Interestingly, when violence broke
out in Kosovo, the UCK had just been included in the US 'black list'
of "terrorist organisations". As early as mid-January 1998 the CIA had
warned that Belgrade was preparing a police offensive on the UCK in
the region.
2) TIME FOR TALKS?
Since Milosevic removed Kosovo's autonomy by military means a few
years ago, there are two major stumbling blocks for mediatory
initiatives aiming at conflict prevention, management and
transformation.
A - the Serbo-Montenegrin federation is not a part of the OSCE. As
widely known, the "internal affairs clause" does not apply within the
OSCE framework. Accordingly, an official visit by the OSCE High
Commissioner on National Minorities, M. Van der Stoel, who is also
a special envoy for Kosovo, has been impeded by Belgrade.
B -- Mirroring this state of things is the fact that Kosovar Albanians
claim they are not a minority but a nation (the same status problem
regards Albanians in Macedonia). Accordingly, Albanians refuse to
meet Van der Stoel in his capacity of OSCE HCNM. Eventually, he
was recently received in Prishtina as a private visitor, a fact that
seemed to suit both opponents.
3 -- The refusal of gradual strategies. An important agreement on
education, which was reached between Belgrade and Prishtina thanks
to the mediation of the Italian Comunita' di S.Egidio, and could have
been a first step towards negotiations, has never been implemented. A
few days after the signatures, some of Rugova's aids that were
heading for Belgrade, died in an obscure car accident.
Of course, the problem of the status of the region remains the most
important one, given the fact that Milosevic is not willing to concede
autonomy, while Prishtina does not appear to be willing to accept
mere autonomy. But it should be remembered maintaining the police
status quo is proving to have unbearable financial implications for
Belgrade's regime, and therefore stronger conditionality attached to
trade and investments in Yugoslavia may have some impact.
Concomitantly, a state of political equilibrium and dormant conflict
seems to be broken in Prishtina, while some 'external actors' may
be tempted to blow on the fire. This may indeed be the ripe moment
for outside parties to step in and help find creative solutions that
re-frame the formal issue of state sovereignty, territoriality and
national community's status. Although the Kosovo case is extremely
complex, and precisely because it has proved to be intractable and
historically amenable only to coercive, intimidating and violent
responses, the only option international mediation has is a creative
strategy which radically departs from the path set hitherto. Speaking
of sustainable peace during a international conference that
discusses shared sovereignty, multi-citizenship, demilitarization,
custom union, regional cooperation schemes, and personal and
territorial autonomy may be an option that is more feasible and
realistic than the continuous deterioration of the status quo. If
this appears too naive to some, one has to bear in mind that the
alternative to this road is a daunting war that would drag every
neighbour, and whose costs is bare terms of human lives are
extremely high.
Francesco Strazzari
- - - - - - - - - -
Francesco Strazzari
Researcher - SPS Department
European University Institute
Via de' Roccettini 9 - Badia Fiesolana
50016 S. Domenico di Fiesole
Firenze - Italy
tel (+39) 55 541204
fax (+39) 55 599887 or 4685298
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